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SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS 
CONNIE P. OZAWA* 
Portland State University 
ABSTRACT: Science plays amajor part in environmental conflict. How 
that role is defined is determined by the human actors engaged in the conflict 
and the legal and institutional constructs hat structure discourse. This 
article begins by tracing the authority invested in science to ideological 
assumptions about scientific methodology. Then, four common roles for 
science in environmental conflict (discoverer, mechanism of accountability, 
shield, and toql of persuasion), are described. These roles are increasingly 
unproductive n resolving environmental conflict, partly due to the misfit 
between the actual conduct of science and its ideal. This article proposes that 
a new role, one that is more consistent with a social constructionist v ew of 
science, has been crafted asa byproduct of decision-making innovations that 
prescribe explicit negotiations among representatives of groups engaged in 
an environmental dispute. As a tool offacilitation, science may be used more 
constructively to resolve environmental disputes. 
INTRODUCTION 
The April 20, 1993, New York Times reported another environmental controversy 
(Strum 1993). The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey filed an applica- 
tion to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to dredge container-ship berths in 
Newark Bay and dump the dredged material in the ocean. What had been an 
annual rite met delay when routine analysis of the silt to be displaced was found 
to contain dioxin. Two groups, environmentalists concerned about the impact of 
dioxin on marine life, such as endangered whales and sea turtles, and the coastal 
tourism industry, advocated storing the dredged material on containment islands 
or barges until economical and effective decontamination technologies became 
available. Although ultimately resolved, more than three years later the Port 
*Direct all correspondence to: Connie P. Ozawa, Portland State University, Department of Urban Studies and Plan- 
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Authority was still waiting for permit approval, losing revenues from nearly half 
the harbor's prime container ship berths. 
Action on the application was delayed for a number of reasons. First, because 
no federal standards existed for dioxin contamination i  the ocean, the EPA 
regional office attempted to establish acceptable levels for this case. The threshold 
for contamination i itially set by EPA was later modified, requiring more testing, 
resulting in further delay, and fueling debate over testing methods. Second, 
although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had conducted research on safe meth- 
ods of ocean disposal, no research specifically on the dumping of dioxin had been 
performed and environmentalists raised doubt about the ability to prevent he 
spread of dioxin-contaminated silt across the ocean floor. Finally, technological 
advances during the 36-month delay led to continual refinement ofthe scientific 
data on which regulators, environmentalists, and the port were basing their deci- 
sions. Rather than engendering reater confidence in the numbers, such modifica- 
tions had the contrary effect of increasing skepticism about the effectiveness and 
stability of the government standard. If the numbers were revised once, what 
would prevent subsequent reconsideration? 
Though the heat underlying the conflict over the harbor dredging was gener- 
ated by the ethical, economic, and ideological implications of altemative actions, 
much of the public debate focused on the technical issues of standards, criteria, 
and testing methodologies. This dispute illustrates what has become a common 
role of science in environmental conflict-science used as a weapon in the arsenal 
of warring public policy actors. 
Environmental conflict was a term virtually unheard of before the 1960s. Thirty 
years later, it is used commonly to refer to the numerous contests over the alloca- 
tion of natural resources, pollution control, and land use. What once were 
mundane activities, such as logging, road building, or dredging harbor floors, 
now frequently provoke raging disputes among contenders equally likely to 
claim to be the protectors of environmental quality. In this article, a distinction is
made between the terms "dispute" and "conflict." Dispute refers to vocalized or 
articulated isagreements over what ought to be done. Conflict is the underlying 
basis for the disagreement-the perceptions (accurate or not) of an undesirable 
distribution of consequent costs and benefits and/or the more subtle redistribu- 
tion of political control over similar decisions in the future. 
Environmental disputes arise not only from the perceptions of unfavorable, 
potential consequences of proposed actions, but also the sense of the legal rights 
and recourse awarded individuals and groups, and validated and institutional- 
ized in national egislation in the United States. Federal egislation, starting earlier 
but most exemplified by the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), mandate 
that decisions affecting the environment ensure that adverse impacts are miti- 
gated to the fullest extent possible. What is adverse, of course, is subject o inter- 
pretation, but clearly the presumption of NEPA is that impacts can be identified 
and evaluated prior to actual implementation fa proposed action. The Clean Air 
Act instructs the Environmental Protection Agency to issue air quality criteria 
that "accurately reflect he latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the 
kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health and welfare" (Clean Air 
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Act 1967). Importantly, these laws and many others include citizen suit provi- 
sions that explicitly award citizens the legal right o question government actions. 
Legislation like these have set the stage for decision makers and others to spot- 
light the scientific and technical elements in environmental disputes. Rather than 
having a role of equal standing with the human actors in a conflict, however, 
science ought best be viewed as a prop in the hands of those enacting environ- 
mental conflicts. This article is about the multiple ways science is used in environ- 
mental conflict. In addition to identifying and describing these multiple roles, I 
argue that a traditional image of science is essential in order for science to be used 
in these ways. I also describe an emerging altemative role, one that is more 
consistent with the social constructionist mage of science. Before xamining the 
various purposes for which this prop called science is used, let us first proceed 
through a brief review of how science became so central in environmental 
conflict. 
THE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE 
In the economic and cultural context of the later 20th century United States and, 
indeed, in much of the industrialized world, science is looked upon as a source of 
authority. This authority derives from a popular notion of the scientific endeavor. 
Science is conceived as a process that yields an objective, rational, politically 
neutral body of knowledge. Decisions consistent with scientific knowledge, there- 
fore, command acceptance. 
A principal feature of the popular conceptualization of the scientific enterprise 
is its strict methodological prescriptions. According to a philosophy of science 
dominant hrough the 1960s, known as logical positivist empiricism, the primary 
test of truth is the replicability of experimental findings. Hiskes and Hiskes 
(1986:10-11) write that logical positivist empiricism assumes that: 
1. Data obtained through careful experiment and observation are objective; 
2. There is one universally valid logic for science; and 
3. Through rigorous application of logic to data, science gradually makes 
progress toward the ancient Greek ideal of theoria. 
According to the logical positivist empiricist view, data are incontrovertible and 
unchanging. The observations of any two rational persons witnessing the same 
event would be identical. Data accumulated through the repetition of similar 
events eventually leads to the development of theory that integrates abstract 
concepts and generalizable principles to explain diverse phenomena. Logic is 
linear and one-directional. In short, this view implies that the products of work 
undertaken through the scientific method are absolute and without ambiguity. 
The characterization fscience as a dispassionate activity, (that is, one that is 
not influenced by the views of the individual scientist), has deep roots. In the 16th 
century, Francis Bacon, a chief proponent of the modem method of scientific 
inquiry, sought to describe a way of accumulating knowledge about the physical 
world that was free of theologically-based distortion and founded on the observa- 
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tion of reality rather than imagination or fancy. Moreover, to depict science in a 
manner that would be palatable to the then-powerful religious establishment, 
Bacon carefully delineated the territory ofscience and claimed that the science of 
nature "is studiously indifferent to good and evil" (Lakoff 1966:9). 
This formulation of science coincided with a period in which intense disputes 
over critical theological and philosophical issues were disrupting English society 
as well as life on the European continent (Ben-David 1971). The growing popular- 
ity of the Baconian view at that time is attributable tothe attractiveness ofthe idea 
that a consensus on procedure is neutral with respect o religion or politics. What 
later became known as the scientific method represented a way for intellectual 
thought o progress in England amidst the havoc of the country's civil revolution 
(Ben-David 1971). 
In more recent years, scientists and their spokespersons have aggressively 
fought to reaffirm and protect the image of a neutral science. Proponents of 
unconditional financial support for scientific research by the federal government 
have argued that the scientific community is, and ought to be allowed to remain, 
self-monitoring and autonomous. The scientific ommunity has been called a 
priesthood, an estate, and a republic (Lapp 1965; Polanyi 1972; Price 1965) and 
scientists, accordingly, have been described as objective, disinterested, uncorrupt- 
ible, and impartial (Wood 1964). Uniform standards of validating fact and the 
self-imposed iscipline of the scientific method are offered as guarantees that 
science is a depersonalized and selfless quest for truth. 
FOUR ROLES FOR SCIENCE 
If scientific work is viewed as completely outside the social and political bickering 
and battling that occurs among individuals and groups in society, then a power- 
ful role for science in environmental conflict would be nearly unassailable. Based 
on the assumption that the scientific method does indeed ensure the political 
neutrality of knowledge thereby produced, stakeholders in environmental 
conflict have crafted four important roles for science. These are the roles of 
science as discoverer, mechanism of accountability, shield, and tool of persuasion. 
Science As Discover 
The role for science most easily associated with an idealized conceptualization 
of the scientific method is the role of discoverer. In this role, a scientist working in 
relative isolation from contemporary social and political skirmishes incidentally 
uncovers a condition the researcher, from her own personal value framework, 
deems worthy of wider discussion or public action. When Oregon State Univer- 
sity student Eric Forsman chanced upon a spotted owl in the Pacific northwest in 
1968, he had no intention that this and subsequent encounters would fuel a 
debate between protecting an endangered species or an endangered livelihood 
twenty ears later. Rowland and Molina's discovery of the correlation between 
CFCs and the ozone hole over Antarctica was similarly not inspired by an ambi- 
tion to change public policy. However, each event contributed significantly to the 
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debates over logging in the Northwest and reductions in the use of ozone-deplet- 
ing gases, respectively. 
In most cases, science plays the role of discoverer or educator only at the earli- 
est stages of, or even prior to, conflict development. The role of science as discov- 
erer reflects an idealized image of a scientist's quest to understand conditions in 
the physical world. One need not look very far, however, to recognize the critical 
effect hat the researcher's personal value framework has on how that researcher 
interprets new information. Although biologists working for large timber compa- 
nies would be unlikely to experience the same intimate moments of solitude with 
the forest as Forsman, had spotted owls crossed their paths in the late 1960s, it is 
doubtful that their responses would have been the same as his. Rare wildlife 
species simply are not a high priority for timber company employees. 
Science as a Mechanism of Accountability 
A second role for science might best be understood by looking back a half 
century to the New Deal period when Franklin D. Roosevelt established a number 
of independent government agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority. These 
independent, specialized agencies were built on the assumption that certain types 
of decisions ought to (and could) be based on technical expertise, not politics. 
Congress reacted swiftly to try to ensure that decisions by such agencies were in 
fact based on non-partisan expertise and not politics by enacting the Administra- 
tive Procedures Act (APA) in 1946. The APA stipulates procedures for agency 
decision making, which essentially prescribes that agencies keep a record of their 
decision-making process and that decisions are consistent with a reading of that 
record. As agency decisions became more technical in nature (as with the regula- 
tion of new technologies and control of air and water pollution) and as new legis- 
lation awarded legal standing to citizen groups to challenge agency decisions, 
decision makers paid increasing attention to technical and scientific studies rele- 
vant to their decisions. 
Since the 1970s, more than twenty new administrative agencies have been 
created, most having to do with environmental and health and safety regulation. 
Corresponding legislation have reinforced the need for decision makers to 
provide explicit technical documentation to support policy decisions. Statutes, 
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA), and Resource Conservation and Reclamation Act (RCRA) 
make explicit reference to the technical basis for decisions. Finally, judges have 
conceived their ole as ensuring that agency decisions are reasonably consistent: 
[The] court has a supervisory function of review of agency decisions. This 
begins with enforcing the requirement of reasonable procedure, fair notice, and 
opportunity for the parties to present their case, and it includes examining the 
evidence and fact findings to see both that he evidentiary fact findings are 
supported by the record and that hey provide a rational basis for inferences of 
ultimate fact (Levanthal 1974:511). 
Although decision making without he benefit of technical expertise in areas such 
as environmental policy would be foolhardy, a primary goal of these decision- 
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making prescriptions was accountability. As long as agency decision makers were 
constrained by the technical experts' interpretations of the physical conditions and 
alternative actions, Congress assumed that raw politics would be constrained. 
Science as a Shield 
Astute decision makers quickly recognized that by framing decisions around 
boundaries drawn by technical studies, they could build a rationale that would 
protect them from the political fallout of publicly unpopular decisions. By 
presenting such information as definitive with respect to policy decisions, the 
decision maker attempts to create the illusion that science is arbitrating between 
multiple policy viewpoints or decision alternatives. For example, a decision 
maker may claim that because certain soil hydrologists have agreed that a partic- 
ular tract of land proposed for development meet criteria defining a wetland, a 
development permit must be denied. In effect, he decision maker is claiming that 
the scientific findings (i.e., the determination that the land is a wetland) preclude 
a decision to allow development and thus absolve him of responsibility and 
shield him from the wrath of unhappy constituents. As one writer noted with 
regard to Congressional deliberations regarding policies for protecting health and 
the environment, "turning the job of defining adequate standards over to the 
'experts' relieves Congressmen [sic] of the burden of resolving difficult controver- 
sies" (Melnick 1983:251). 
The political expediency of this tactic is obvious, but the logic is questionable. In 
practice, the decision-maker exercises considerable discretion in formulating a 
response to scientific reports. He may accept the findings and rule otherwise (for 
other specified reasons, such as economic hardship, for example), he may seek 
additional advice, or he may order additional study. Throughout his term in office, 
Ronald Reagan avoided dealing with the acid rain issue raised by groups in the 
northeastern United States and Canada. Rather than heeding experts who believed 
the available evidence indicated a causal relationships between smokestack emis- 
sions from the industrial mid-West and rising acidity levels and ailing forests 
further north, Reagan preferred tolisten to those scientists who cautiously avoided 
affirming a connection. Deciding to adopt the decision alternative suggested by a 
scientific finding or to wait for further confirmation is a political act. 
Science as a Tool of Persuasion 
Once science is recognized as a source of authority for justifying decisions, it is 
a small step to see its power in persuading the polity of the legitimacy of one 
policy or decision alternative over others (Dickson 1984; Nelkin and Pollack 
1981). Like religion and the rule of the monarchy prior to the Age of Enlighten- 
ment, science is used in twentieth century decision making as a primary source of 
legitimacy to gain political support: 
By invoking the authoritative canons of scientific reasoning and method, public 
authorities and others having a stake in technical issues eek to demonstrate the 
rationality of their position and thereby gain political support and acceptance 
(Brickman 1984:108). 
Science in Environmental Conflicts 225 
In this role, science can be used either to support advocated positions in envi- 
ronmental conflicts or "to prevent policy being made around a rival scientific 
conclusion" (Collingridge and Reeve 1986). Opponents of a proposal might 
attempt o prevent a decision by either presenting alternative scientific data or 
analysis or by questioning the assumptions or interpretations of scientific reports 
that support the proposal. One well-known example of this strategic use of 
science in regulatory decision making is the tobacco industry's effort o stall 
restrictions on cigarette smoking by attempting to discredit studies linking ciga- 
rette smoking to lung cancer. In nearly any environmental conflict today, partici- 
pants routinely raise questions about the assumptions, data, and models used in 
analyses that support opposing viewpoints. 
If science and politics are separate, the boundary between science and policy is 
blurry at best. Science can play the role of discoverer only at very early stages of 
an environmental conflict, o flag a concern for action. But how that concern is 
framed and whether it is acted upon is a political decision. Science as a mecha- 
nism of accountability similarly serves to moderate the abuse of delegated deci- 
sion-making authority, but by no means eliminates administrative discretion. 
Casting science in the role of a tool of persuasion or a shield is a politically 
motivated act on the part of the user (policy actor) to capitalize on the authority of 
science derived from its image as politically neutral. However, as quickly as one 
set of policy advocates attempt o appropriate science to support their preferred 
policy or decision alternative, opposition groups move to undermine their posi- 
tion by discrediting the scientific basis of that position. The politics that are 
imbedded in science are readily uncloaked. 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 
If scientific work was indeed as free of the idiosyncracies of the investigator as the 
ideal described earlier would suggest, environmental conflict would not end, but 
the scope of the disputes would be narrowed considerably with each additional 
contribution from scientists with relevant expertise. Disputes would revolve 
around what to do in response to a given situation, not around defining the 
conditions themselves. For example, if EPA knew absolutely that dioxin in 
concentrations below a given amount would not endanger marine life directly or 
indirectly, debate over the dredging of the New Jersey harbor might be narrowed 
to a discussion of dumping method, location, or timing. 
However, much in the literature of the social studies of science suggests that 
scientific work is not free of political content. Irrespective of the rigidities of the 
scientific method, a multitude of discretionary judgments are made during the 
course of a scientific nvestigation by the researcher. Thomas Kuhn describes the 
progression of scientific nquiry as a temporally bound consensus among scien- 
tists. According to Kuhn, researchers perceive curves in the distribution of data 
points on a graph in patterns that fit pre-existing theory (Kuhn 1982). While 
researchers have identified discretionary judgments in laboratory research 
(Latour 1979), the predictive sciences relied on for illuminating conditions in envi- 
ronmental conflicts are fraught with even higher levels of discretion (Bacow 
1980). For example, in predicting the potential impacts of the construction of a 
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road through a forest, wildlife biologists would need to make assumptions about 
a seemingly endless list of items, including the geographic boundaries of the 
study area, the species to be studies, conditions in surrounding wooded lands, the 
migration patterns of animals under changed conditions, and the level of environ- 
mental devastation occurring during the road building period itself from the 
intrusion of heavy construction equipment. While these assumptions and others 
like them are to some extent constrained by conventions of practice, many cases 
are sufficiently unique to make such cross-references arguably uninformative. 
The choice of assumptions, boundaries, and definitions of variables are replete 
with methodological uncertainties and indeterminacy (Klapp 1992; Wynne 1992). 
For example, the selection of a model to simulate meteorological conditions 
predicting air pollution plumes cannot be determined through any kind of scien- 
tific exercise, but is ultimately a judgment based on the researchers' assessment of 
the similarities between model parameters and real life conditions or the match 
between available data and the variables used in the model. 
Wynne (1992) has further differentiated methodological uncertainty. He identi- 
fies ignorance as contributing touncertainty in scientific analysis. Simply, scien- 
tists are unable to account for factors of which they are unaware. In contrast o the 
popular belief that scientific knowledge and method recognize and attempt o 
reduce uncertainties, Wynne (1992:115) argues: 
It is more accurate to say that scientific knowledge gives prominence to a 
restricted agenda of defined uncertainties-ones that are tractable-leaving invisi- 
ble a range of other uncertainties, pecially about the boundary conditions of 
applicability of the existing framework of knowledge to new situations (empha- 
sis in original). 
Another type of uncertainty encountered in science has been described as 
statistical uncertainty. Intheory, statistical uncertainty can be eventually reduced 
as more and more data are accumulated. However, in practice, decisions are 
made long before sufficient data are obtained. 
Dealing with uncertainty requires a judgment on the part of researchers in the 
course of their work. How one selects methodologies, models, measuring devices, 
indeed even one's choice of scientific theory, is seldom rigidly defined by current 
practice. These discretionary elements are influenced by social and political 
factors uch as the individual's institutional affiliations, source of research funds, 
and disciplinary training (Knorr-Cetina 1982). Viewed in this light, scientific work 
carries the signature of the individual researcher and acceptance of scientific 
work by the scientific community more accurately represents a consensus among 
scientists, rather than objective fact. 
AN ALTERNATIVE ROLE: SCIENCE AS A TOOL OF FACILITATION 
In the highly contentious context of the 1980s, the art of utilizing scientific argu- 
mentation for furthering political objectives flourished. The authority of science 
was exploited by groups on multiple sides of any given debate, prolonging deci- 
sions on particular conflicts for several years in many cases and increasing 
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expenses for government, private developers and industry, and community orga- 
nizations. A sentiment was developing in the academic sphere that science in the 
role of arbiter in environmental conflict was a misuse of scientific work. More- 
over, to sustain the image of science as authoritative with respect o decisions that 
were inherently political is a displacement of political power from elected politi- 
cians to the hands of an elite corps of scientific experts (Dickson 1984). Reports on 
Ronald Reagan's heavy-handed oversight of the selection of scientists to serve on 
advisory committees uch as the Environmental Protection Agency's Science 
Advisory Board made such suspicions all the more disturbing (Ashford 1984). 
The question remains, can science play a role in resolving environmental 
conflict? Over the past decade, an alternative role for science has been emerging 
as a by-product of decision-making innovations that include explicit negotiations 
among individuals and representatives ofgroups engaged in an environmental 
dispute. In one version of environmental mediation, the scientific and technical 
information necessary to understand current conditions and to identify possible 
options for action is one of the first opics on the agenda (Carpenter and Kennedy 
1988; Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Almost 
from the start, the negotiating roup discusses what kind of technical knowledge 
is pertinent. The more particular discretionary judgments encountered in scien- 
tific and technical investigations are openly discussed and subject to agreement 
(Ozawa and Susskind 1985). These judgments include decisions about the kind of 
information needed, data collection techniques, analytical models and methodol- 
ogies, how to deal with statistical and methodological uncertainty and, some- 
times, the disciplinary training and institutional ffiliation of the researcher. 
Finally, the interests and concerns of various groups with a stake in the decision 
are explicitly acknowledged and a period of time is set aside in the negotiations to 
address them. The outright recognition of competing interests serves as a signal 
to stakeholding roups (and the public) that such issues will be addressed in the 
decision-making process. With such assurance, stakeholders contending to domi- 
nate the decision process are less inclined to posture behind admittedly disput- 
able technical argumentation, as they do in more adversarial procedures in which 
winning on the technical points likely means protecting their interests, and are 
more willing to focus on collectively accumulating and making sense of relevant 
data and analyses. Because the discretionary nature of assumptions is acknowl- 
edged, sensitivity analysis or the substitution of variables or values for specific 
variables is easily accommodated by the negotiating roup, again, defusing 
potential disputes over technical aspects of the decision. 
An early example of this approach was a 1986 rulemaking procedure 
conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Ozawa 1991). In 
response to a lawsuit filed against the agency for failure to regulate carcinogenic 
polycyclic organic matter (POMs) under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, the 
agency invited representatives from key stakeholding roups, including wood 
stove manufacturers, national and local environmental organizations, and vari- 
ous state agencies from four states to develop emission standards for wood-burn- 
ing stoves, the third largest source of POMs. Operating under a strict deadline, 
the group successfully crafted a proposal that was supported by all participants. 
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This agreement was achieved through a carefully structured procedure. At the 
first meeting, the group agreed to defer discussion of specific political concerns 
until after a solid technical basis for the rules was jointly constructed. The group 
labored long hours to develop this foundation of technical knowledge. Data and 
existing studies were collected from all known sources and closely scrutinized by 
technical experts from the EPA, the industry, and the environmental organiza- 
tions, independently and together as a group. The discretionary nature of 
research assumptions and the inevitable statistical nd methodological uncertain- 
ties were uncovered and debated. For example, it was widely accepted that wood 
stoves equipped with a catalyst emit fewer particulates than non-catalyst models, 
but no data existed to indicate how quickly catalysts degrade. The relative perfor- 
mance of catalyst-equipped stoves over the long term was thus highly uncertain. 
The testing performance of all models, for that matter, was disputable since emis- 
sion rates vary according to basic factors uch as how users stack wood and the 
age, type, and wetness of wood. 
Discussion of assumptions regarding testing procedures, degradation rates, 
and countless other factors accentuated the fact that the rules were, at their core, 
political, not technical, products. However, this realization did not lead partici- 
pants to ignore the science, as some might fear, but rather encouraged them to 
look more soberly at what scientific evidence existed to guide their deliberations. 
In some cases, the group collectively agreed that rather than thinking in terms of 
specific points on a scale, emission rates (or other figures) ought to be regarded as 
a range of plausible points. 
The role of science in this regulatory negotiation comes closest o the traditional 
role of discoverer, described in an earlier section. Scientific knowledge was 
shared not simply to prove the superiority of one policy alternative over another, 
but to educate all participants about the status and quality of available informa- 
tion. Science in this regulatory negotiation went beyond the role of discoverer, 
however. By working together to construct a joint understanding of the technical 
aspects of the standard-setting task, groups with competing political interests 
were also learning to listen to another and to appreciate one another's talents, 
skills, and knowledge base. Discussing mundane issues such as the way most 
people stack wood or the dominant ype of wood burned in particular egions of 
the country provided a relatively calm atmosphere conducive to dialogue. Impor- 
tantly, those with specialized expertise were explicitly asked and reminded that 
their ole was to educate, not intimidate, the group on technical issues. The meet- 
ings also provided an opportunity for informal discussions and the formation of 
coalitions that facilitated the exchange of interest-related information a d devel- 
opment of a fuller understanding of and mutual respect for all legitimate claims. 
In this case, science provided an opportunity for participants to develop a 
constructive pattern of interaction. 
CONCLUSION 
This example suggests that an alternative role for science in environmental conflict 
may be crafted. However, the decision-making process must be deliberately struc- 
tured to ensure the following conditions. First, access to scientific expertise and 
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analysis must be open to all stakeholding parties. Second, the agenda for negotia- 
tions must clearly set aside a period for addressing explicitly political concerns in 
order to discourage participants from stubbornly posturing behind technical posi- 
tions that they believe will afford them political gains. Finally, experts invited to 
participate in the decision-making process must commit o share scientific nfor- 
mation in order to educate, not intimidate, the stakeholders. Ifthese conditions are 
met, a discussion of relevant echnical information can provide an opportunity for 
parties to gain a fuller understanding of both the technical and political dimensions 
of the dispute. Science can be used as a tool of facilitation. Just as science was used 
as a means of advancing intellectual thought in the highly contentious context of 
16th century England, negotiating the scientific basis for environmental decisions 
may represent a way to maintain dialogue and develop a constructive understand- 
ing of the multiple perspectives of a given environmental conflict. 
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